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Abstract
Coalition analysis is extended to incorporate uncertain preference into three sta-
bility concepts, general metarationality (GMR), symmetric metarationality (SMR),
and sequential stability (SEQ) under the paradigm of the graph model for conict
resolution. As a follow-up analysis in the graph model, coalition analysis aims to as-
sess whether equilibriums under individual calculations are vulnerable to coalition
moves and countermoves and, hence, become unstable under coalition stabilities.
Coalition analysis has been considered for transitive graph models with simple pref-
erence under four stabilities, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, as well as general graph
models with uncertain preference for the Nash stability. This paper introduces pref-
erence uncertainty into coalition stabilities under GMR, SMR, and SEQ for general
graph models that can be transitive or intransitive. Depending on the focal coali-
tion's dierent attitudes towards preference uncertainty, four dierent extensions
are presented. Interrelationships of coalition stabilities are investigated within each
∗Corresponding author. E-mail: inohara@valdes.titech.ac.jp (Takehiro Inohara).
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extension and across the four extensions. A case study is carried out to illustrate
how to apply the proposed coalition stabilities.
Keywords: Conict analysis, coalition analysis; preference uncertainty; graph model.
1 Introduction
Conict and confrontation among agents with distinct interests may occur at many dif-
ferent settings and scales [3]. To handle strategic conicts, dierent approaches have been
put forward such as hypergame analysis [7], drama theory [2], and the graph model for
conict resolution [3]. As a simple but exible group decision technology, the graph model
is a proven and invaluable tool for modeling and analyzing strategic conict in which two
or more self-interested agents are in dispute over some issues [3, 10]. When a conict
model is established within the graph model framework, two stages are involved: model-
ing and analysis. In the modeling stage, an analyst or stakeholder identies two or more
decision-makers (DMs) involved in the conict situation, each DM's available courses of
action or options, feasible states formed by all DMs' plausible option selections, state
transitions among feasible states controlled by each DM, as well as all DMs' preference
over feasible states [3]. Once a conict model is set up, the analysis stage involves a stan-
dard stability analysis and some follow-up analyses such as coalition analysis [8,9,11,22]
and status quo analysis [15, 16, 21]. The stability analysis assesses stability of each state
from each DM's perspective and a state that is stable for all DMs is called an equilibrium,
corresponding to a potential resolution for the conict model. The stability analysis is
built upon a noncooperative concept with an underlying assumption that each DM acts
independently for its own best interests after calculating its moves as well as coutermoves
by its opponents. Following this line of thinking, the status quo analysis takes a forward
looking perspective to assess how DMs act and react to direct a conict from a status
quo state or initial state to any particular equilibrium that is of interest to the analyst
or stakeholders [16,17,21]. On the other hand, the other post-stability analysis, coalition
analysis follows a cooperative viewpoint and assesses whether individual DMs can jointly
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improve their position by joining a coalition [8, 11,22].
Coalition formation and stability have been an active research area in game the-
ory [1, 12, 13, 19]. The coalition analysis considered here is conned to the graph model
for conict resolution paradigm. As Kilgour et al. [11] put it, coalition analysis assesses
whether self-interested and independent DMs can gain by forming a coalition and coor-
dinating their moves. This paper follows the idea in [11,22] and treats coalition analysis
as a post-stability analysis. The implication is that only equilibria identied in the sta-
bility analysis stage will be examined for coalition stability. The rationale is that a
non-equilibrium state is not sustainable as at least one DM is expected to deviate from
it unilaterally based on the DM's calculations. An equilibrium, on the other hand, is
expected to sustain for a while since no DM is motivated to depart from it as per individ-
ual contemplations. However, when two or more DMs form a coalition, an equilibrium
may be upset via a sequence of joint moves by the coalition members. In this case, the
target state should also be an equilibrium as any non-equilibrium state is transient. This
process is referred to as an \equilibrium jump" in [11]. Understandably the target state
of an equilibrium jump should presumably make all members in the coalition better o
and cannot be achieved by any DM acting individually. Coalition analysis, therefore,
aims to alert the analyst whether such a coalition exists and, if existent, which equilibria
are vulnerable to equilibrium jumps and how these jumps are attained by coalition joint
moves.
When a state is assessed for individual stability, dierent solution concepts such as
Nash stability (Nash) [18], general metarationality (GMR) [7], symmetric metarational-
ity (SMR) [7], and sequential stability (SEQ) have been proposed to characterize DMs'
distinct behavioural patterns in face of conict [3]. For details of the characteristics and
interrelationships of these solution concepts, readers are referred to Fang et al. [3] and
the original references therein.
The original graph model methodology employs a simple preference structure, con-
sisting of strict preference (≻) and indierence (∼) relations, to characterize DMs' relative
preference over feasible outcomes. To accommodate the case that some preference infor-
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mation is unknown to the analyst, Li et al. [14] develop a non-probabilistic framework
to handle preference uncertainty in the graph model where a new binary relation U is
introduced to represent a DM's uncertainty about its preference between two states. The
four solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, have been redened based on the
extended preference structure. Depending on how unknown preferences are incorporated,
four versions of stability denitions are put forward and labeled as a, b, c, and d accord-
ingly. These dierent extensions are conceived to reect the focal DM's distinct attitudes
towards preference uncertainty, ranging from conservative, to mixed and aggressive [14].
Within the graph model framework, coalition analysis has been actively studied. Mo-
tivated by the strong equilibrium concept by Aumann [1], Kilgour et al. [11] introduce a
coalition Nash stability concept with simple preference and the aim is to alert whether
a status quo equilibrium can be upset by joint moves coordinated by a subset of DMs
or a coalition. Subsequently, Inohara and Hipel [8] extend the idea and dene coalition
GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability. The interrelationships of these coalition stabilities are
then examined [9]. For tractability, the aforesaid research has been conned to transitive
graphs with the simple preference structure, in which consecutive moves by the same DM
are allowed. By exploiting a convenient matrix system, Xu et al. [22] investigate coalition
Nash stability with preference uncertainty for general graph models, where the require-
ment of no successive moves by the same DM is honoured to keep the new development
consistent with the general decision rule in the graph model methodology. According to
how uncertain preferences are incorporated, conservative and aggressive coalition Nash
stabilities are introduced [22].
Building upon the research by Xu et al. [22] and Inohara and Hipel [8, 9], the contri-
bution of this article is to integrate preference uncertainty into coalition GMR, SMR, and
SEQ stabilities. To keep notation consistent with individual stabilities in Li et al. [14],
four dierent versions of each coalition stability will be dened accordingly.
To illustrate how this new development can be applied in practice, a coalition analysis
is conducted for a case study of bulk-water export conict occurred in the Province of
Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada. This conict was rst examined by Fang et al. [4]
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and a three-DM graph model is established to investigate strategic interactions among
dierent stakeholders. Subsequently, preference uncertainty is introduced into the model
to characterize the oscillating attitude of the provincial government towards bulk-water
export from its jurisdiction [14]. These analyses furnish useful strategic advice on how
dierent stakeholders may act and react to bring the conict to potential resolutions. The
current analysis moves one step further by investigating which equilibria are sustainable
and will not be upset by coalition moves and which equilibria are likely to be transient
and susceptible to be overturned by a subgroup of DMs coordinating their moves. The
aim is to shed additional structural insights on whether any DM may further improve its
position by joining a coalition.
To make the paper self-contained, the next section briey reviews the graph model
for conict resolution and puts the current research in a proper context. Section 3 de-
nes coalition GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities with preference uncertainty. Section 4
investigates interrelationships of coalition stabilities within each extension and across the
four extensions, followed by an illustrative case study in Section 5. The paper concludes
with some remarks in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The graph model for conict resolution
A graph model consists of a set of DMs N;2 ≤ ∣N ∣ < ∞, a nite set of feasible states
S, a collection of digraphs Gi = (S;Ai); i ∈ N , where S is the vertex set and Ai is DM
i's set of directed arcs in Gi and depicts the moves among feasible states controlled by
DM i, and relative preference over the feasible states for all DMs [3]. When a graph
model is not too big, it is often convenient to draw an integrated digraph for all DMs
where arcs are appropriately labeled with controlling DMs. As the graph model has
the exibility in characterizing common moves, it is possible that two arcs a1 and a2
may share the same pair of starting and terminal states s1 and s2, i.e., a1 = (s1; s2) and
a2 = (s1; s2). In this case, these common moves must be controlled by dierent DMs such
5
that a1 ∈ Ai; a2 ∈ Aj; i; j ∈ N; i ≠ j.
Preference information plays a central role in conducting a stability analysis. The
original graph model adopts a pair of binary relations {≻i;∼i}, the so-called simple pref-
erence, to represent DMs' relative preference over feasible states. In practice, the analyst
may have a hard time in obtaining accurate preference information about the conict
when complicated and multiple criteria have to be evaluated [5, 6], and sometimes, even
the DMs themselves cannot tell their true preference when the conict is still ongoing
and evolving. To handle partially unknown preferences, Li et al. [14] extend the simple
preference structure to a triplet of binary relations {≻i;∼i; Ui}. For DM i and any two
states s1; s2 ∈ S, s1 Ui s2 indicates that DM i is uncertain about its preference between
s1 and s2, which may turn out to be either s1 ≻i s2, s1 ∼i s2 or s2 ≻i s1 when additional
information becomes available.
For a general preference relation P and three states s1; s2, and s3, if s1P s2 and
s2P s3 imply s1P s3, then P is called transitive. The graph model does not require DMs'
preferences to be transitive. As indicated in the sustainable development game in Li et
al. [14], the uncertain preference relation can be intransitive. The new development here
inherits this ne property and is applicable to both transitive and intransitive preferences.
2.2 Existing coalition analysis in the graph model
Coalition analysis has been studied in the graph model with simple preference under four
solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ [8, 9, 11]. Xu et al. [22] further extend
coalition Nash stability to accommodate uncertain preference. Below, a brief introduction
is presented for the existing coalition analysis research.
A subset of DMs H ⊆ N is called a coalition. Generally speaking, an empty coalition
H does not have any realistic meaning and, hence, it is hereafter assumed that ∣H ∣ ≥ 1.
When ∣H ∣ = 1, the coalition H is called trivial as it contains only a single DM. If ∣H ∣ > 1,
the coalition is nontrivial.
Before stability denitions are introduced, it is necessary to characterize a DM's
potential moves starting from a status quo state s, the following lists dene DM i's
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possible moves incorporating dierent preference information [3, 14].
i) Reachable list: Ri(s) = {t ∈ S ∶ (s; t) ∈ Ai}, describing the states that are reachable
by DM i unilaterally in one step.
ii) Unilateral improvement (UI) list: R+i (s) = {t ∈ S ∶ (s; t) ∈ Ai and t ≻i s}, depicting
the states that are attainable by DM i unilaterally in one step and the terminal
state is more preferred by the DM.
iii) Unilateral improvement or uncertain move (UIUM) list: R+;Ui (s) = {t ∈ S ∶ (s; t) ∈ Ai
and t ≻i s or t Ui s}, dening the states that are achievable by DM i unilaterally
in one step and the DM either prefers the terminal state or is uncertain about its
preference between the terminal and starting states.
For a general n-DM graph model (∣N ∣ = n ≥ 3), the opponents of a focal DM i consist
of a coalition N − i and ∣N − i∣ ≥ 2. When a focal DM contemplates a potential move
away from a status quo, some solution concepts such as GMR, SMR, and SEQ require it
to account for its opponents' countermoves. The countermoves by a nontrivial coalition
is comprised of all states that are attainable from a particular state via a legal sequence
of unilateral moves (UMs) by any subset of DMs in the coalition, where a DM may move
more than once but not consecutively [3]. In existing coalition analysis research with
simple preference in the graph model [8, 9, 11], the rule of no consecutive moves by the
same DM is lifted for the sake of tractability. The implication is that the applicability of
the research is restricted to transitive graph models. Xu et al. [22] bring this restriction
back to their coalition Nash stability with uncertain preference.
In parallel to Ri(s) by a single DM, the reachable list by a coalition H ⊆ N , denoted
by RH(s), can be dened inductively below. If s1 ∈ RH(s), denote by 
H(s; s1) the set
of all last DMs in legal sequences of UMs from s to s1.
Denition 1 A unilateral move by H is a member of RH(s) ⊆ S, dened inductively by
(1) if j ∈H and s1 ∈ Rj(s), then s1 ∈ RH(s) and j ∈ 
H(s; s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ RH(s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ Rj(s1), then s2 ∈ RH(s) provided that 
H(s; s1) ≠ {j},
and j ∈ 
H(s; s2).
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Denition 1 ensures that a DM may move more than once in a legal sequence of moves
by coalition H, but not in succession. If each move in the sequence is restricted to be a
UIUM for the mover, one can have the following denition of coalition UIUM list R+;UH (s).
Similarly, if s1 ∈ R+;UH (s), denote by 
+;UH (s; s1) the set of all last DMs in legal sequences
of UIUMs from s to s1.
Denition 2 A unilateral improvement or uncertain move (UIUM) by H is a member
of R+;UH (s) ⊆ S, dened inductively by
(1) if j ∈H and s1 ∈ R+;Uj (s), then s1 ∈ R+;UH (s) and j ∈ 
+;UH (s; s1);
(2) if s1 ∈ R+;UH (s), j ∈ H and s2 ∈ R+;Uj (s1), then s2 ∈ R+;UH (s) provided that 
+;UH (s; s1) ≠{j}, and j ∈ 
+;UH (s; s2).
If each move in the legal sequence is restricted to be a UI for the mover, the resulting
set will be the coalition UI list R+H(s) starting from state s for coalition H. For brevity,
the denition of R+H(s) is omitted here.
To dene coalition stability, Kilgour et al. [11] introduce the following concept of
coalition improvement (CI).
Denition 3 For a status quo state s and a nonempty coalition H ⊆ N , a state s1 ∈
RH(s) is a coalition improvement for H from s, denoted by s1 ∈ CR+H(s), i s1 ≻i s
for every i ∈H.
It is worth noting that CR+H(s) ≠ R+H(s) asR+H(s) denotes all states that are attainable
by coalition H via legal sequences of UIs from s. Although each individual move is a
UI for the mover, there is no guarantee that the terminal state is preferred to s by any
DM involved in the sequence of moves [3]. On the contrary, CR+H(s) ensures that the
terminal state is always preferred to s by all DMs in the coalition though an individual
move along the sequence may not be a UI for the mover [11].
This paper envisages coalition analysis as a post-stability analysis and examines
whether equilibria that are stable for all DMs under individual calculations are vul-
nerable to joint moves by coalitions. Therefore, both the status quo and target states
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are presumably equilibria. Next, coalition stabilities under Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ
with simple preference are furnished.
Denition 4 State s ∈ S is Nash stable for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCNashH , i
CR+H(s) = ∅.
This coalition Nash stability is adapted from [11], but CR+H(s) here is expected to
honour the rule of no successive moves by the same DM and, hence, this denition is
applicable to both transitive and intransitive graph models. As mentioned earlier, an
empty coalition does not have any realistic meaning, it is assumed hereafter that ∣H ∣ > 0.
If ∣H ∣ = 1, then H = {i} and CR+H(s) = R+i (s). In this special case, Denition 4 is
reduced to individual Nash stability [18]. However, for a nontrivial coalition H ⊆ N; ∣H ∣ ≥
2, coalition Nash stability checks the coalition improvement list CR+H(s) rather than
coalition members' individual UI lists R+i (s); i ∈H.
If state s ∈ S is Nash stable for every nonempty coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalition-
ally Nash stable and denoted by s ∈ SCNash.
For notational convenience, let s ⪰i t represent s ≻i t or s ∼i t, and ⪯H(s) = {t ∈ S ∶
s ⪰i t for at least one i ∈ H}. It is apparent that ⪯H(s) considers only the preference
relative to state s without examining the reachability of those states from s by H.
Denition 5 State s ∈ S is general metarational (GMR) for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted
by s ∈ SCGMRH , i for every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s).
This coalition GMR denition is adapted from [8,9]. Instead of using subclass reach-
able lists as in [8, 9], a coalition reachable list by the opponents is adopted here. Under
the assumption of no consecutive moves by the same DM in a legal sequence of UMs,
Denition 5 is equivalent to Denition 7 in [8]. Similarly, if H = {i}, this denition is
reduced to individual GMR [7].
If state s ∈ S is GMR for every coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally GMR stable
and denoted by s ∈ SCGMR.
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Denition 6 State s ∈ S is symmetric metarational (SMR) for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted
by s ∈ SCSMRH , i for every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s)
and s3 ∈ ⪯H(s) for all s3 ∈ RH(s2).
This coalition SMR denition is adapted from [8, 9] and is equivalent to Denition 9
in [8]. The only dierence here is, once again, the incorporation of no consecutive moves
by the same DM in any sequence of UMs. Similarly, if H = {i}, Denition 6 is reduced
to individual SMR [7].
If state s ∈ S is SMR for every coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally SMR stable
and denoted by s ∈ SCSMR.
Denition 7 State s ∈ S is sequentially stable (SEQ) for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by
s ∈ SCSEQH , i for every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ R+N−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s).
Remark: By employing the subclass improvement list concept, the coalition SEQ
stability denition introduced by Inohara and Hipel [8, 9] is able to consider credible
sanctions by subcoalitions in the opponent camp. But this thoroughness comes at a signif-
icant computational cost as the number of subcoalitions increases exponentially with the
number of opponents, making the calculation of subclass improvement list prohibitively
dicult when the number of DMs in the model is large. In addition, it remains open
about how to enforce the legality of sequences of moves by subcoalitions. As a tradeo,
it is proposed here to treat opponents N −H as individuals. For transitive graph models,
if a state is SEQ for a coalition under Denition 7 here, it is automatically SEQ for the
coalition under Denition 11 in [8]. However, the inverse is generally not true. Similarly,
when H = {i}, coalition SEQ would be reduced to individual SEQ stability.
If state s ∈ S is SEQ for every coalition H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally SEQ stable
and denoted by s ∈ SCSEQ.
Xu et al. [22] extend coalition Nash stability proposed by Kilgour et al. [11] by in-
cluding uncertain preference in the coalition Nash stability denitions. Depending on
the focal coalition's attitude towards risks associated with uncertain moves [14], aggres-
sive and conservative coalition Nash stabilities are introduced [22]. As a preparation, a
coalition improvement or uncertain move (CIUM) is dened rst.
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Denition 8 For a status quo state s and a nonempty coalition H ⊆ N , a state s1 ∈
RH(s) is a coalition improvement or uncertain move for H from s, denoted by
s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), i s1 ≻i s or s1 Ui s for every i ∈H.
CR+;UH (s) here diers from R+;UH (s) in Denition 2 in that R+;UH (s) cares about the
process without worrying about the nal result, but CR+;UH (s) is concerned with the
nal result instead of the process. In other words, R+;UH (s) requires each move in a legal
sequence has to be a UIUM for the mover, but the preference relation between a nal state
and status quo for the coalition is not a concern at all. On the contrary, CR+;UH (s) ensures
that all coalition members prefer the terminal state to the status quo or are uncertain
about their preference between these two states without examining the relative preference
for each individual move along the legal sequence. Next, denitions of conservative and
aggressive coalition Nash stability can be introduced [22]. To be consistent with the four
extension notation in Li et al. [14], these two denitions are relabeled accordingly.
Denition 9 State s ∈ S is aggressively Nash stable for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by
s ∈ SCNashaH , i CR+;UH (s) = ∅.
Denition 10 State s ∈ S is conservatively Nash stable for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by
s ∈ SCNashbH , i CR+H(s) = ∅.
Similar to the equilibrium concept in stability analysis under individual calculations,
coalition Nash stability for aggressive and conservative DMs can be ascertained as follows:
If state s ∈ S is aggressively (or conservatively) Nash stable for every nonempty coalition
H ⊆ N , it is called coalitionally aggressively (or conservatively) Nash stable and denoted
by s ∈ SCNasha (or s ∈ SCNashb).
Although Denition 10 looks the same as Denition 4, they are dierent in the sense
that Denition 10 is dened with preference uncertainty where uncertain moves are not
strong enough motivation for the focal coalition to deviate from its status quo state. On
the other hand, Denition 4 is dened for transitive graph models with simple preference
and does not consider uncertain preference in its conception. As Nash stability does
not examine countermoves by the opponents, similar to individual stability case in [14],
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SCNashaH = SCNashcH and SCNashbH = SCNashdH . For brevity, coalition Nash stability under
extensions c and d, which are identical to that under extensions a and b, respectively,
will not be repeated here.
3 Coalition stability with preference uncertainty in
the graph model
Coalition Nash stability has been extended to general graph models with uncertain pref-
erence by Xu et al. [22]. This section will consider coalition GMR, SMR, and SEQ
stabilities with preference uncertainty.
DMs may exhibit dierent attitudes towards uncertainty when making choices. For
instance, an optimistic DM tends to view uncertainty as a potential opportunity while a
pessimistic DM may often regard an uncertain outcome as a risk. In addition, a DM's
attitude towards uncertainty change with its status quo state: a DM who has little to lose
is more likely to take an aggressive attitude towards uncertainty and treat it as a potential
gain. On the contrary, a DM who has little to gain is highly likely to regard uncertain
outcomes as a risk and adopt a conservative stance. To accommodate dierent attitudes
towards preference uncertainty, Li et al. [14] dene individual Nash, GMR, SMR, and
SEQ stabilities with preference uncertainty under four forms, a, b, c, and d. The purpose
of these four extensions is to characterize a focal DM with diverse attitudes towards pref-
erence uncertainty, ranging from aggressive, to mixed and conservative. When coalition
GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability denitions are extended from graph models with simple
preference [8] to those with uncertain preference, these four extensions are maintained
depending on the focal coalition's attitude towards preference uncertainty.
Denition 11 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCGMRaH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s).
Denition 12 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSMRaH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s) and s3 ∈ ⪯H(s) for
all s3 ∈ RH(s2).
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Denition 13 State s ∈ S is SEQ for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSEQaH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ R+;UN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s).
In extension a, the focal coalition members are conceived to be aggressive as they
are willing to deviate from the status quo state for uncertain outcomes (uncertainty is
allowed at the incentive end for the focal coalition). While assessing sanctions from their
opponents, at least one coalition member must be ascertained for a no-better-o position
in order to successfully block the focal coalition (uncertainty is not allowed at the sanction
end for the focal coalition).
Denition 14 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCGMRbH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s).
Denition 15 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSMRbH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s) and s3 ∈ ⪯H(s) for
all s3 ∈ RH(s2).
Denition 16 State s ∈ S is SEQ for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSEQbH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ R+;UN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s).
Compared to the coalition stability denitions in extension a, the only dierence
is that this extension does not treat uncertain moves as sucient incentive for the fo-
cal coalition to deviate from the status quo. The focal coalition under this extension
presumably exhibits mixed attitude towards preference uncertainty, conservative at the
incentive end but aggressive at the sanction end [14]. Although Denitions 14, 15, and
16, respectively, look the same as Denitions 5, 6, and 7, they are in fact dierent in
the sense that Denitions 14, 15, and 16 are conceived with preference uncertainty but
uncertain moves are neither strong enough motivation for the focal coalition to deviate
from the status quo nor allowed as valid sanctions to deter the focal coalition. On the
other hand, Denitions 5, 6, and 7 are designed for graph models with simple preference.
For convenience, let ⪯;UH (s) = {t ∈ S ∶ s ⪰i t or s Ui t for at least one i ∈H}.
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Denition 17 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCGMRcH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯;UH (s).
Denition 18 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSMRcH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯;UH (s) and s3 ∈ ⪯;UH (s)
for all s3 ∈ RH(s2).
Denition 19 State s ∈ S is SEQ for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSEQcH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ R+;UN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯;UH (s).
Extension c assumes that uncertain moves are allowed as sucient incentives and
sanctions for the focal coalition and is designed to characterize focal coalition members
with mixed attitude towards preference uncertainty: aggressive at the incentive end but
conservative at the sanction end.
Denition 20 State s ∈ S is GMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCGMRdH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯;UH (s).
Denition 21 State s ∈ S is SMR for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSMRdH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯;UH (s) and s3 ∈ ⪯;UH (s) for
all s3 ∈ RH(s2).
Denition 22 State s ∈ S is SEQ for coalition H ⊆ N , denoted by s ∈ SCSEQdH , i for
every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ R+;UN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯;UH (s).
Coalition stability denitions in extension d are devised for conservative focal coali-
tions: When contemplating incentives, they do not envision uncertain moves as oppor-
tunities (preference uncertainty is not allowed as incentives); while assessing sanctions,
these DMs would view uncertain moves as potential harms (preference uncertainty is
allowed as valid sanctions).
Similarly, if state s ∈ S is GMR, SMR, or SEQ stable for each coalition H ⊆ N
under a particular extension, it is called coalitionally GMR, SMR, or SEQ stable under
this extension, and denoted by s ∈ SCGMRk , s ∈ SCSMRk , or s ∈ SCSEQk ; k = a, b, c,
d. It is obvious that SCGMRk = ∩H⊆NSCGMRkH , SCSMRk = ∩H⊆NSCSMRkH , and SCSEQk =∩H⊆NSCSEQkH , k = a, b, c, d.
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4 Interrelationships of coalition stabilities with pref-
erence uncertainty
For the four solution concepts, Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, dierent interrelation-
ships exist for individual stabilities with both simple preference [3] and uncertain prefer-
ence [14]. This section examines interrelationships of coalition stabilities with preference
uncertainty and the examination starts with interrelationships among the four coalition
stabilities within each extension.
Theorem 1 Interrelationships of coalition stability for H within each extension. For a
particular extension k ∈fa, b, c, dg and a nonempty H ⊆ N , SCNashkH ⊆ SCSEQkH ⊆ SCGMRkH
and SCNashkH ⊆ SCSMRkH ⊆ SCGMRkH .
Proof: The proof will be carried out for extension a only and the remaining three
extensions can be proved similarly.
Firstly, for a state s ∈ S and a nonempty H ⊆ N , if s ∈ SCNashaH , Denition 9 implies
that CR+;UH (s) = ∅. Then it automatically follows that s ∈ SCGMRaH ; s ∈ SCSMRaH and
s ∈ SCSEQaH . Hence, SCNashaH ⊆ SCGMRaH , SCNashaH ⊆ SCSMRaH , and SCNashaH ⊆ SCSEQaH .
Next, we prove that SCSEQaH ⊆ SCGMRaH . For any state s ∈ SCSEQaH , either CR+;UH (s) = ∅
or CR+;UH (s) ≠ ∅. If CR+;UH (s) = ∅, then s ∈ SCNashaH ⊆ SCGMRaH based on the aforesaid
argument. Next, we examine the case that CR+;UH (s) ≠ ∅. As per Denition 13, for
every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ R+;UN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s). By Denition 2,
R+;UN−H(s1) ⊆ RN−H(s1), implying that s ∈ SCGMRaH .
Lastly, we certify that SCSMRaH ⊆ SCGMRaH . For any state s ∈ SCSMRaH , either CR+;UH (s) =∅ or CR+;UH (s) ≠ ∅. If CR+;UH (s) = ∅, then s ∈ SCNashaH ⊆ SCGMRaH as certied above. If
CR+;UH (s) ≠ ∅, based on Denition 12, for every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1)
such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s) and s3 ∈ ⪯H(s) for all s3 ∈ RH(s2). Without considering H's re-
sponse s3, one obtains s ∈ SCGMRaH . 2
It should be noted that SCGMRaH ⊈ SCSMRaH . The reason is as follows: If s ∈ SCGMRaH ,
for every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s). However,
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as long as for a particular s2, there exists s3 ∈ RH(s2) such that s3 ∈ CR+;UH (s), then
s ∉ SCSMRaH .
Similarly, SCGMRaH ⊈ SCSEQaH . Once again, if s ∈ SCGMRaH , for every s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s),
there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s). In this case, if for a particular s1 ∈
CR+;UH (s), R+;UN−H(s1) = ∅, then s ∉ SCSEQaH .
In addition, there generally does not exist any inclusion relationship between SCSEQaH
and SCSMRaH , either.
Theorem 1 ascertains the interrelationships for the four coalition stabilities for a
particular nonempty coalition within each extension. Given that for any extension k,
SCGMRk = ∩H⊆NSCGMRkH , SCSMRk = ∩H⊆NSCSMRkH , and SCSEQk = ∩H⊆NSCSEQkH , k = a, b,
c, d, the following corollary immediately follows:
Corollary 1 Interrelationships of coalition stability within each extension For a partic-
ular extension k ∈fa, b, c, dg, SCNashk ⊆ SCSEQk ⊆ SCGMRk and SCNashk ⊆ SCSMRk ⊆
SCGMRk .
The interrelationships of the four coalition stabilities within each extension can thus
be depicted in a Venn diagram as shown in Fig. 1. The result here is consistent with
the interrelationships for individual stabilities with simple preference [3] and uncertain
preference [14] as well as coalition stabilities with simple preference [9].
CGMR
CSMR
CNash
CSEQ
Figure 1: Interrelationships of coalition stabilities within each extension
Next, the interrelationships of each coalition stability across the four extensions will
be investigated. First, for coalition Nash stability, the following result holds true.
Theorem 2 Interrelationships of coalition Nash stability for H across extensions. For a
nonempty H ⊆ N , SCNashaH = SCNashcH , SCNashbH = SCNashdH , and SCNashaH ⊆ SCNashbH .
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Proof. When Denitions 9 and 10 are introduced, it has been mentioned that
SCNashaH = SCNashcH , SCNashbH = SCNashdH . Now, we shall conrm that SCNashaH ⊆ SCNashbH .
For H ⊆ N and any s ∈ S, if s ∈ SCNashaH , by Denition 9, R+;UH (s) = ∅. As R+H(s) ⊆
R+;UH (s), it follows that R+H(s) = ∅, implying that s ∈ SCNashbH . 2
Similarly, Corollary 2 immediately follows.
Corollary 2 Interrelationships of coalition Nash stability across extensions. SCNasha =
SCNashc, SCNashb = SCNashd, and SCNasha ⊆ SCNashb.
The interrelationships of coalition Nash stabilities across the four extensions can be
illustrated as a Venn diagram in Fig. 2.
CNashb = CNashd
CNasha = CNashc
Figure 2: Interrelationships of coalition Nash stabilities across extensions
Next, interrelationships across the four extensions will be investigated for the remain-
ing three coalition stabilities (CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ) with preference uncertainty.
For conciseness, let CSC be a generic coalition solution concept, which can be CGMR,
CSMR, or CSEQ.
Theorem 3 Interrelationships of CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ stabilities for H across four
extensions. For a nonempty H ⊆ N and a particular CSC, SCSCaH ⊆ SCSCbH ⊆ SCSCdH and
SCSCaH ⊆ SCSCcH ⊆ SCSCdH , where CSC = CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ.
Proof. The proof will only be carried out with coalition GMR stability. The interre-
lationships for the other two coalition stabilities can be similarly proved.
First, we shall prove that, for an H ⊆ N and any s ∈ S, if s ∈ SCGMRaH , then s ∈
SCGMRbH ; s ∈ SCGMRcH ; and s ∈ SCGMRdH .
If s ∈ SCGMRaH and CR+;UH (s) = ∅, then s ∈ SCNashaH = SCNashcH ⊆ SCNashbH = SCNashdH as
per Denition 9 and Theorem 2. Based on Theorem 1, it is conrmed that s ∈ SCGMRbH ; s ∈
SCGMRcH , and s ∈ SCGMRdH .
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Next, we consider the case that CR+;UH ≠ ∅. Two cases may arise: if CR+H(s) = ∅, by
Denition 10, s ∈ SNashbH and, hence, s ∈ SCGMRbH by Theorem 1. Otherwise, if CR+H(s) ≠∅, as s ∈ SCGMRaH , for every s1 ∈ CR+H(s) ⊆ CR+;UH (s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such
that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s). By Denition 14, s ∈ SCGMRbH .
For extension c, since s ∈ SCGMRaH , for any s1 ∈ CR+H(s) ⊆ CR+;UH (s), there exists
s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s) ⊆ ⪯;UH (s), implying that s ∈ SCGMRcH .
For extension d, the case of CR+H(s) = ∅ is trivial and we only consider CR+H(s) ≠ ∅.
For any s1 ∈ CR+H(s) ⊆ CR+;UH (s), as s ∈ SCGMRaH , there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that
s2 ∈ ⪯H(s). By Denition 20, s ∈ SCGMRdH .
Next, we shall prove that, for any s ∈ S, if s ∈ SCGMRbH , then s ∈ SCGMRdH . If s ∈ SCGMRbH
and CR+H(s) = ∅, then s ∈ SCNashbH = SCNashdH as per Denition 10 and Theorem 2. By
Theorem 1, we have s ∈ SCGMRdH .
The following argument assumes that CR+H(s) ≠ ∅. Since s ∈ SCGMRbH , for any s1 ∈
CR+H(s), there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯H(s). As ⪯H(s) ⊆ ⪯;UH (s), by
Denition 20, s ∈ SCGMRdH .
Lastly, we shall verify that SCGMRcH ⊆ SCGMRdH . For any s ∈ SCGMRcH , either CR+H(s) =∅ or CR+H(s) ≠ ∅. If CR+H(s) = ∅, then s ∈ SCNashbH = SCNashdH by Denition 10 and
Theorem 2. If CR+H(s) ≠ ∅, for every s1 ∈ CR+H(s), we also have s1 ∈ CR+;UH (s) due to
CR+H(s) ⊆ CR+;UH (s). Since s ∈ SCGMRcH , there exists s2 ∈ RN−H(s1) such that s2 ∈ ⪯;UH (s).
This completes the proof of SCGMRcH ⊆ SCGMRdH .
The aforesaid argument proves that SCGMRaH ⊆ SCGMRbH ⊆ SCGMRdH and SCGMRaH ⊆
SCGMRcH ⊆ SCGMRdH . 2
It is apparent that the following corollary holds true.
Corollary 3 Interrelationships of CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ stabilities across four ex-
tensions. For a particular CSC, SCSCa ⊆ SCSCb ⊆ SCSCd and SCSCa ⊆ SCSCc ⊆ SCSCd,
where CSC = CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ.
The interrelationships of CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ stabilities revealed in Theorem 3 and
Corollary 3 can thus be illustrated in Fig. 3.
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CSCd
CSCb
CSCa
CSCc
Figure 3: Interrelationships of coalition stabilities across extensions, where CSC =
CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ
5 A case study: Coalition analysis for the Gisborne
conict
The conict surrounding the Lake Gisborne bulk-water export issues was rst established
as a three-DM graph model by Fang et al. [4]. The conict arose in June 1995 when a
local company proposed to export bulk water from Lake Gisborne located in the Province
of Newfoundland and Labrador in Canada. The project was approved by the provincial
government in anticipation of its economic benet in December 1996, but this initial
approval was heavily criticized by a number of lobby groups, citing unpredictable detri-
ments to the local environment and culture. This opposition was subsequently echoed by
the Canadian federal government with the introduction of a new policy to prevent water
export from major drainage basins in Canada. The mounting pressure led the provincial
government to withdraw its support and introduce a ban on bulk water export from New-
foundland and Labrador in late 1999. This development seemingly brought the conict
to a conclusion. However, in March 2001 when a new provincial government took the
oce, the newly elected premier initiated a review of the Gisborne project. This move
received immediate attention from the opposition group. Although the tension was soon
eased by a reiteration of the ban in a government report released on October 18, 2001,
the evolution of events surrounding the Gisborne project indicates that this conict may
arise again in the future if potential revenue from water export creates a strong enough
incentive for an economically-oriented provincial government to deviate from its current
position. For more details about the development of this conict, readers are referred
to [4] and [14].
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Table 1: DMs and options in the Gisborne conict model [14]
DMs Options
DM 1: Federal government (Federal) 1. Continue a Canada wide ac-
cord on the prohibition of bulk
water export (Continue)
DM 2: Provincial government of New-
foundland and Labrador (Provincial)
2. Lift the ban on bulk water ex-
port (Lift)
DM 3: Support groups (Support) 3. Appeal for continuing the Gis-
borne project (Appeal)
A graph model was developed for this conict with three DMs and each DM con-
trolling one option as shown in Table 1. In this model, DM 1 includes both the Federal
Government of Canada and opposition groups, DM 2 is self-evident, and DM 3 stands
for both the rm that proposed the Gisborne project and other groups that support bulk
water export from Canada. A brief explanation is furnished in Table 1 for each option
controlled by the corresponding DM.
The resulting eight feasible states are given in Table 2, where a \Y" opposite an
option indicates that the option is selected by the controlling DM and an \N" indicates
the corresponding option is not chosen by the DM.
Table 2: Feasible states for the Gisborne conict model [14]
Federal
1. Continue N Y N Y N Y N Y
Provincial
2. Lift N N Y Y N N Y Y
Support
3. Appeal N N N N Y Y Y Y
States s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
To model the oscillation of the provincial government's attitude towards the Gisborne
bulk water export conict, Li et al. [14] introduced uncertain preference for DM 2 Provin-
cial. The relative preference information for this conict model is furnished in Table 3.
For DM 2, except for the strict preference indicated in the four pairs of states enclosed
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within the curly brackets, remaining preference relations are assumed to be uncertain be-
tween any two states from any two dierent curly brackets. For instance, the provincial
government prefers state s3 to s7, but is uncertain about its preference between s3 and
any other states.
Table 3: Preference information for the Gisborne model [14]
DMs Relative preference
1. Federal s2 ≻ s6 ≻ s4 ≻ s8 ≻ s1 ≻ s5 ≻ s3 ≻ s7
2. Provincial fs3 ≻ s7} U {s4 ≻ s8} U {s1 ≻ s5} U {s2 ≻ s6}
3. Support s3 ≻ s4 ≻ s7 ≻ s8 ≻ s5 ≻ s6 ≻ s1 ≻ s2
An integrated graph of this conict model is illustrated in Fig. 4 where the nodes
correspond to the eight states and the DMs are labeled on the arcs to indicate the moves
controlled by the DMs.
s1
s4s2
s3 s5
s8s6
s7Provincial
Federal
Provincial
Provincial
Federal
Provincial
Support
FederalFederal
Support
Support
Support
Figure 4: An integrated graph of the Gisborne conict model [14]
Based on the moves controlled by each DM given in Fig. 4, one can obtain the
reachable list for each of the seven nonempty coalitions as shown in Table 4, where a
particular coalition is identied by an appropriate subscript in columns 2 through 8.
This coalition reachable list information is needed for determining coalition improvement
lists and coalition improvement or uncertain move lists as well as examining countermoves
by an opponent coalition in assessing CGMR and CSMR stabilities.
By incorporating DMs' preference information into the coalition reachable lists, the
following coalition improvement or uncertain move lists can be derived as given in Table
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Table 4: Coalition reachable lists for the Gisborne model
s R{1}(s) R{2}(s) R{3}(s) R{1;2}(s) R{1;3}(s) R{2;3}(s) R{1;2;3}(s)
s1 s2 s3 s5 s2; s3; s4 s2; s5; s6 s3; s5; s7 s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s7; s8
s2 s1 s4 s6 s1; s3; s4 s1; s5; s6 s4; s6; s8 s1; s3; s4; s5; s6; s7; s8
s3 s4 s1 s7 s1; s2; s4 s4; s7; s8 s1; s5; s7 s1; s2; s4; s5; s6; s7; s8
s4 s3 s2 s8 s1; s2; s3 s3; s7; s8 s2; s6; s8 s1; s2; s3; s5; s6; s7; s8
s5 s6 s7 s1 s6; s7; s8 s1; s2; s6 s1; s3; s7 s1; s2; s3; s4; s6; s7; s8
s6 s5 s8 s2 s5; s7; s8 s1; s2; s5 s2; s4; s8 s1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s7; s8
s7 s8 s5 s3 s5; s6; s8 s3; s4; s8 s1; s3; s5 s1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s8
s8 s7 s6 s4 s5; s6; s7 s3; s4; s7 s2; s4; s6 s1; s2; s3; s4; s5; s6; s7
Table 5: Coalition improvement or uncertain move lists for the Gisborne model
s CR+;U{1} (s)CR+;U{2} (s)CR+;U{3} (s)CR+;U{1;2}(s)CR+;U{1;3}(s)CR+;U{2;3}(s)CR+;U{1;2;3}(s)
s1 s2 s3 s5 s2; s4 s6 s3; s7 s4; s6; s8
s2 − s4 s6 − − s4; s8 −
s3 s4 s1 − s1; s2; s4 − − −
s4 − s2 − s2 − − −
s5 s6 s7 − s6; s8 − s3; s7 s4; s8
s6 − s8 − − − s4; s8 −
s7 s8 s5 s3 s5; s6; s8 s3; s4 s3 s3; s4
s8 − s6 s4 s6 s4 s4 s4
5, where a \−" indicates an empty CIUM list and a coalition improvement is highlighted
with an overline for the corresponding state in a CIUM list. For instance, from Table 5,
one can have R+;U{1;2;3}(s7) = {s3; s4} but R+{1;2;3}(s7) = {s3} as only s3 is highlighted by an
overline, indicating that it is a coalition improvement for the grand coalition N = {1;2;3}
relative to the status quo state s7. Similarly, Table 5 shows that R
+;U{1;2}(s1) = {s2; s4}
but R+{1;2}(s1) = ∅ as none of the CIUMs starting from s1 is identied as a coalition
improvement for H = {1;2} by an overline. The information in Table 5 will play a
signicant role in determining whether a focal coalition will be possibly motivated to
deviate from a status quo in coalition stability.
In assessing CSEQ stability, one has to examine the credibility of the sanction by the
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opponents N −H. Table 6 furnishes this information. Since a nonempty coalition will not
be examined for CSEQ stability, its opponents, the grand coalition N , is thus excluded
from Table 6.
Table 6: Unilateral improvement or uncertain move lists by a coalition for the
Gisborne model
s R+;U{1} (s) R+;U{2} (s) R+;U{3} (s) R+;U{1;2}(s) R+;U{1;3}(s) R+;U{2;3}(s)
s1 s2 s3 s5 s2; s3; s4 s2; s5; s6 s3; s5; s7
s2 − s4 s6 s4 s6 s4; s6; s8
s3 s4 s1 − s1; s2; s4 s4 s1; s5; s7
s4 − s2 − s2 − s2; s6; s8
s5 s6 s7 − s6; s7; s8 s6 s1; s3; s7
s6 − s8 − s8 − s2; s4; s8
s7 s8 s5 s3 s5; s6; s8 s3; s4; s8 s1; s3; s5
s8 − s6 s4 s6 s4 s2; s4; s6
By utilizing the information in Tables 4, 5, and 6, one can conduct a coalition analysis
for CNash, CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ under the four extensions as dened in Sections
2 and 3. As mentioned earlier, this paper treats coalition analysis as a follow-up analysis
after a standard stability analysis. Therefore, only predicted equilibria under individual
calculations are examined for coalition stability.
A stability analysis by Li et al. [14] reveals that states s4, s6, and s8 possess some
equilibrium status under various circumstances. As this research treats coalition analysis
as a follow-up analysis after a standard stability analysis, coalition stability is examined
for these three states only. The analysis result is summarized in Tables 7 (for CNash
and CGMR stabilities) and 8 (for CSMR and CSEQ stabilities). For the sake of space,
each coalition is simply identied by the corresponding DM(s) without curly brackets.
For instance, 12 in the second row of Tables 7 and 8 stands for coalition H = {1;2}.
A
√
in the column of a particular coalition in Tables 7 and 8 indicates that a state is
stable for this coalition under a specic extension of a coalition solution concept (CSC).
If a state is stable for all nonempty coalitions under an extension of a CSC, a
√
is
placed in the appropriate cell in the column for the particular CSC, indicating that the
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state is coalitionally stable for this CSC in terms of the specic extension. For instance,
Table 7 illustrates that states s4 and s6 are coalitionally conservatively Nash stable (under
extensions b and d) and coalitionally GMR stable under extensions b, c, and d. Similarly,
Table 8 shows that states s4 and s6 are coalitionally SMR stable under extensions b, c,
and d, but coalitionally SEQ stable for extensions b and d only.
Tables 7 and 8 conrm the interrelationships of the four coalition solution concepts,
CNash, CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ, within each extension and across the four extensions
as described in the previous section.
Coalition analysis results in Tables 7 and 8 also shed structural insights into the
Gisborne conict. More specically, states s4 and s6 are Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ
equilibria under extensions b and d as ascertained by Li et al. [14], our analysis here
further conrms that they remain coalitionally stable for the four solution concepts under
these two extensions. A common feature between extensions b and d is that the rst mover
(either an individual DM or a coalition) is conservative towards preference uncertainty
and is unwilling to depart for uncertain outcomes. Therefore, as long as an analyst is
condent that the DMs in this conict are conservative at the incentive end, states s4
and s6 will be sustainable resolutions under both individual and coalition considerations.
[14] also indicates that states s4 and s6 are GMR, SMR, and SEQ equilibria under
extension c. Table 7 and 8 show that they remain coalitionally GMR and SMR stable
under this extension, but only s4 is coalitionally SEQ stable. Equilibrium s6 can be
upset by DMs 2 and 3 forming a coalition and coordinating their moves (Provincial
government sides with the support group and DMs are aggressive at the incentive end).
In this case, their CIUMs from state s6 are s4 and s8, which leave their opponent Federal
without any credible sanction. Given that coalition analysis is a post-stability analysis
and state s8 is not an SEQ equilibrium, a viable coalition move is an equilibrium jump
from s6 to s4, i.e., s6 Ð→2 s8 Ð→3 s4 or s6 Ð→3 s2 Ð→2 s4, where a subscript of an arrow
indicates a DM controlling a particular move. If the rst mover (an individual DM or
a coalition) believes that its opponents are also concerned with their welfare in their
response as depicted in the SEQ stability, the only sustainable resolution of this conict
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would be state s4 provided that the DMs' risk prole towards preference uncertainty can
be characterized by extension c.
[14] further reveals that state s8 is GMR and SMR equilibrium under extensions
b, c, and d. Our analysis here indicates that this equilibrium will not survive coalition
moves for CGMR or CSMR under any of the three extensions. The implication is that
equilibrium s8 is likely a transient resolution and may be overturned by coalition moves.
Since s4 is preferred by all DMs relative to s8 and has the strongest individual and
coalition stability status in this model, an equilibrium jump from s8 to s4 seems to be
the most likely outcome.
Table 7: Coalition analysis result for CNash and CGMR for the Gisborne
model
State
CNashH CNash
CGMRH CGMR
1 2 3 12 13 23 123 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
s4
a
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
a
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
a
√ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
6 Conclusions
This article incorporates preference uncertainty into coalition analysis under three solu-
tion concepts, GMR, SMR, and SEQ, in the framework of the graph model for conict
resolution. The interrelationships are investigated for the four coalition solution con-
cepts, CNash, CGMR, CSMR, and CSEQ within each extension and across the four
extensions. The proposed development is illustrated by a bulk-water export conict oc-
curred in Canada and structural insights are garnered about how the conict may be
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Table 8: Coalition analysis result for CSMR and CSEQ for the Gisborne model
State
CSMRH CSMR
CSEQH CSEQ
1 2 3 12 13 23 123 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
s4
a
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
a
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
a
√ √ √ √ √ √
b
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
c
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
d
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
settled after considering potential coalitions.
Generally speaking, the proposed research reported herein enables an analyst to ex-
amine whether a subset of DMs can attain a better outcome by forming a coalition and
coordinating their moves in a strategic conict with three or more DMs and uncertain
preference. As shown in the case study in Section 5, it can be quite tedious to carry
out the coalition analysis proposed in this article. To facilitate an analyst to apply the
proposed analysis, it is a worthy topic to address how to implement it into a decision
support system. To facilitate computer implementation, Xu et al. [20,22] have developed
an innovative matrix structure to represent moves and preferences in a graph model. It
would be worthwhile to investigate how to incorporate matrix representation into this
new development so that computer implementation can be conveniently tackled.
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